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TAX COMPETITION: 
HOW GREAT IS THE CHALLENGE?**
Hardly any week passes by in ‘Old Europe’ without a discussion about 
tax reforms as a reaction to the fl at tax challenge of new member countries 
of the European Union (EU). By many observers this is interpreted as an 
expression of the race to the bottom that supposedly results from fi erce tax 
competition in Europe and around the globe. Instead of looking at descrip-
tive fi gures of corporate income taxes, an answer to the question how big the 
challenge of tax competition actually is requires to, fi rst, fi nd out what impact 
tax competition could have on the allocation of scarce resources and how it 
could affect income redistribution by the state. Second, empirical evidence 
should be provided on the existence and the actual economic impact of tax 
competition. Both topics are addressed in this paper by seeking to answer 
the following questions: How does tax competition work? What is the impact 
of tax competition on the effi ciency of public goods‘ provision and on the 
effectiveness of income redistribution? Is there any infl uence of tax competi-
tion on regional convergence and economic growth? And fi nally: Does tax 
competition, in analogy to competition in private markets, serve as a discovery 
procedure in the public sector such that better public policies are more quickly 
detected and diffused? 
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1. Introduction
Hardly any week passes by in ‘Old Europe’ without a discussion about tax 
reforms as a reaction to the fl at tax challenge of some new member countries of 
the European Union (EU). From the Baltic countries via Slovakia to Romania, the 
fl at tax movement has gained momentum among East European states. Meanwhile 
nine of them have introduced fl at rate taxes on personal income ranging from 12 to 
33 percent. The Economist even speaks about the Flat Tax Revolution (April 16th 
– 22nd 2005) and deems the fl at-tax idea to be worth taking seriously by “maturer 
neighbors to the west and across the Atlantic” (p. 9). These maturer European 
neighbors react. The majority of the Scientifi c Council to the German Ministery of 
Finance suggests to introduce a fl at rate income tax in Germany (Wissenschaftli-
cher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2004), while Switzerland is 
tacitly exploring the possibilities for a fl at rate income tax. In the opposing camp 
of tax reformers, the Nordic countries, Austria, the Netherlands, but also the Ger-
man Council of Economic Advisors fi ght for dual income taxation with a lower 
proportional tax rate on capital and corporate income combined with progressive 
labor income taxes (SVR 2004). 
However, these recent developments fuel the fears of tax competition as a ‚race 
to the bottom‘ in capital taxation. It is argued that the increased capital mobility 
in a globalized world provides incentives for states to reduce tax rates in order to 
attract businesses. Keeping other things equal, fi rms choose their location in coun-
tries with lower corporate income tax rates. The strategic reduction of tax rates of 
one country induces another country, perhaps the one in which a fi rm already has 
branches, to follow suit such that a ruinous competition between states presum-
ably results. Consequently, public services are said to be provided ineffi ciently 
and capital owners are accused of not paying their ‚fair‘ share of taxes. Income 
redistribution may not be fi nanced to the same extent as before and welfare states 
are under pressure. This assessment of the recent developments has lead Germany 
and France to propose that EU structural funds should be contingent on minimum 
tax rates on corporate and capital income. 
At fi rst sight, descriptive empirical evidence seemingly supports the race to 
the bottom thesis. For example, OECD tax ratios indicate that the share of corporate 
income taxes has declined over time. Changes in tax ratios may however result from 
changes in tax rates, in the defi nition of tax bases, in the number of taxpayers and in 
GDP. These macroeconomic tax ratios do thus not provide reliable evidence on tax 
burdens of fi rms because they refl ect the interaction of tax policy, location choice 
and general business development instead of tax policy alone. A look at statutory 
corporate income tax rates in selected OECD countries (Figure 1) reveals however 
that at least this component of tax ratios has declined markedly in recent decades. 
On average, a fall from 47.9 percent in 1982 to 32.7 percent in 2004 results. For 
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some countries, like Austria (A), Finland (Fin) and Sweden (S) but also Germany 
(D), the reduction is even more important. Only Ireland (Irl) and Spain (E) have 
slightly increased their statutory corporate tax rates during these decades, the former 
only under pressure from the EU. Moreover, the new EU members have statutory 
corporate income tax rates of only about 20 percent on average, ranging from a tax 
rate of zero for retained earnings in Estonia (26 percent for distributed profi ts) and 
15 percent in Lithuania and Latvia, over 19 percent in the Slovak Republic and in 
Poland, to 28 percent in the Czech Republic. The decline in tax rates seems to go 
on in the future. Austria has reduced its statutory corporate income tax rates from 
34 to 25 percent in 2005, the Netherlands will decrease the rates from 34.5 to 29 
percent in 2007, Finland from 29 to 26 percent in 2007, and the Czech Republic 
from 28 to 24 percent in 2006. (BMF 2005). It looks like tax competition has indeed 
intensifi ed in recent days.
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Figure 1
STATUTORY CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES IN PERCENT, 
16 OECD COUNTRIES, 1982 AND 2004 
Source: Devereux, Griffi th and Klemm (2002) and BMF (2005)
Investment by fi rms is however not only infl uenced by statutory tax rates. 
Firms also consider any kind of tax deductions and relieves. The actual tax burden 
levied on new investment projects is measured by effective tax rates which are 
calculated on the basis of tax rate and tax base differentials. If a plant has already 
been established, fi rms take marginal investment decisions and consider marginal 
effective tax rates. Location choice is infl uenced by average effective tax rates. 
Average effective corporate tax rates of selected OECD countries are shown in 
Figure 2. They fell even more strongly from 42 percent in 1982 to 30.0 percent in 
2003 on average. Again Finland, Sweden, Austria and Germany, but also Portugal 
(P) are the countries with strongest reductions in effective tax burdens. Similar to 
statutory rates, effective average corporate income tax rates of the new EU mem-
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ber states are even lower than those of the old members in 2004. Aside Estonia, 
Lithuania has the lowest tax burden of 13.11 percent, followed by Hungary with 
13.95 percent, Latvia 14.29 percent, the Slovak Republic 16.82 percent, the Czech 
Republic 17.05 percent and Poland 17.46 percent (Jacobs et al. 2003). Statutory tax 
rates are still important for international taxation. They infl uence in which coun-
tries fi rms locate their profi ts via transfer pricing. In addition, statutory rates serve 
as signals for foreign fi rms which do not suffi ciently know the details of another 
country’s tax code. But effective average tax rates fi nally attract business capital 
looking for a new location. Thus, the two fi gures perfectly refl ect the concerns of 
policymakers in the OECD. 
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Figure 2
EFFECTIVE AVERAGE CORPORATE TAX RATES IN PERCENT, 
16 OECD COUNTRIES, 1982 AND 2003 
Source: Devereux, Griffi th and Klemm (2002), Sachverständigenrat (2004, S. 527) and ZEW 
(2005)
This descriptive evidence is taken by governments of EU welfare states as sup-
porting the fears of a race to the bottom. It provides the basis for fi nance ministers 
and the Commission to develop far-reaching proposals for tax harmonization in 
Europe. Neither the descriptive evidence from Figures 1 and 2 nor the anecdotal 
evidence provided by multinationals suffi ces however to support such claims for 
tax harmonization. An answer to the question how big the challenge of tax com-
petition actually is requires instead to, fi rst, fi nd out what impact tax competition 
could have on the allocation of scarce resources and how it could affect income 
redistribution by the state. Second, empirical evidence should be provided on the 
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existence and the actual economic impact of tax competition. The questions that 
need to be asked are: How does tax competition work? What is the impact of tax 
competition on the effi ciency of public goods‘ provision and on the effectiveness 
of income redistribution? Is there any infl uence of tax competition on regional con-
vergence and economic growth? And fi nally: Does tax competition, in analogy to 
competition in private markets, serve as a discovery procedure in the public sector 
such that better public policies are more quickly detected and diffused?
In this paper, these issues are discussed by starting with the potential infl u-
ence of tax competition on the effi ciency of the public sector, the effectiveness of 
income redistribution and economic growth (Section 2). The hypotheses that follow 
from this theoretical discussion are confronted with the results from econometric 
studies that provide more systematic empirical results than the above-mentioned 
descriptive evidence. In Section 3, the empirical evidence on the existence of tax 
competition is surveyed, while an overview on empirical tests of the effects of tax 
competition is presented in Section 4. Finally, a summary and some policy impli-
cations follow in Section 5.
2. Theoretical Arguments on Fiscal Competition1
2.1. The Basics
Although the political discussion is mainly about tax competition, it must be 
recognized at the outset of the analysis that the state is also offering public services 
in exchange for the taxes that citizens pay and hence provides a bundle of goods 
and services for certain tax prices. In the following, the broader concept of fi scal 
competition is therefore considered. This switch in the terminology allows to avoid 
many mis-understandings that often come up in the political and scientifi c debates. 
Given that clarifi cation, the analysis of fi scal competition can naturally start from 
drawing an analogy between competition in private markets and competition 
between states. Since A. Smith (1776), economists perceive competition as the 
driving force for effi cient market outcomes. The invisible hand leads private actors 
to follow individual preferences. In a dynamic perspective, competition serves as 
a discovery procedure and induces useful innovation and technological change. 
Competition is thus necessary for a growing economy. Tiebout (1956) argues that 
competition between jurisdictions works in a similar fashion. In a global world, 
different countries offer different tax rates and different levels of public services to 
1 This section draws on Feld (2005).
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mobile factors of production. Mobile production factors can choose their location 
or residence in a country whose public sector supply best fi ts their preferences and 
interests. Individuals and fi rms vote by feet and thereby reveal their preferences for 
public goods. This leads to an effi cient provision of public services under certain 
conditions. 
In addition, decentralized provision and fi nancing of public services allows to 
use decentralized information to the largest possible extent. The closer a government 
is to the people, the better it is informed about their wishes and demands. Locally 
dispersed knowledge about public problem solutions can thus be used effi ciently 
(Kerber 1998). Finally, the frustration of citizens about public policy solutions is 
minimized, the more decentralized public goods‘ provision is. Finding median 
preferences across the national populace necessarily involves less differentiation 
among individuals. Decentralization allows to differentiate public goods and serv-
ices such that those who want to have more or a better quality of public goods can 
move to the jurisdiction with higher levels of publicly provided goods. Citizens 
are willing to pay higher prices for that offer and could thus be charged higher 
tax prices. Similarly those who want to have less can move to jurisdictions with 
lower levels of public services. The migration process leads to more homogeneous 
jurisdictions and to lower frustration costs. 
Oates (1972, p. 30) consequently proposes his decentralization theorem ac-
cording to which a decentralized provision and fi nancing of public goods at the 
lowest possible level is effi cient in a world of high mobility of production factors and 
people with different preferences. However, the decentralization theorem only holds 
if the correspondence principle (Oates 1972) or the principle of fi scal equivalence 
(Olson 1969) is respected. Both principles similarly require that the jurisdiction 
that decides upon the level of public services should comprise the consumers of 
that good and those that bear the costs as taxpayers. Only in this case, the sum of 
marginal willingness to pay for public goods corresponds to the marginal tax price. 
Whenever the principle of fi scal equivalence is violated, decentralized provision 
and fi nancing of public goods may lead to ineffi ciencies. This could be the case if 
externalities or economies of scale in consumption exist. Moreover, equity issues 
may pose problems for a competitive provision and fi nancing of public services.
2.2. Potential Distortions
Externalities from fi scal competition might result in the form of regional or 
fi scal externalities. Regional externalities are comprised of positive or negative 
benefi t spillovers as well as cost spillovers. Positive benefi t spillovers come up for 
example if Dutch tourists use the German highway system, but do not contribute 
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according to their marginal willingness to pay. Congestion externalities will arise. 
Negative benefi t spillovers may exist in the case of cross-border pollution. Cost 
spillovers exist in the case of tax exporting, for example if multinational corpora-
tions whose shares are internationally distributed are taxed in a particular country. 
Because the shareholders of a multinational company cannot participate to the same 
extent in the political process as those of a national corporation, a government has 
incentives to raise corporate income taxes to ineffi ciently high levels above the 
willingness to pay of the shareholders of multinationals. The costs of public services 
are externalized because a part of the tax burden is paid by residents from other 
jurisdictions providing incentives for ineffi ciently high levels of public services or 
for excessive taxation (Huizinga and Nielsen 1997, Fuest and Huber 2002).
Fiscal externalities work in the opposite direction of tax exporting. They 
may arise from strategic tax competition for mobile capital. Italy is for example 
in tax competition with Croatia. If Croatia drops the corporate income tax rate, it 
attracts Italian fi rms. This relocation reduces the tax burden of the Croatian resi-
dents because provision costs can be distributed among more taxpayers. However, 
the relocation increases the tax burden of Italian residents because less taxpayers 
have to fi nance that given amount of Italian public services. If both countries do 
not consider the changes in tax burdens in each country when deciding about the 
level of public services, fi scal externalities arise (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986, 
Wilson 1986). This argument does not hold to the same extent if public infrastruc-
ture is becoming an additional parameter for relocation decisions. Infrastructure 
is then adjusted in the fi scal competition game such that fi scal externalities might 
fi nally vanish (Keen and Marchand 1997, Borck 2004, Wildasin 2004). Moreover, 
cost or benefi t spillovers on the one hand and fi scal externalities on the other hand 
might compensate for each other such that public goods can be effi ciently provided 
(Bjorvatn and Schjelderup 2002, Sørensen 2000, 2004, Noiset 2003). It has also 
been broadly discussed to what extent the distortions from fi scal competition are 
more severe under asymmetry conditions, e.g. if relatively small countries compete 
with relatively large countries. No clear-cut results have emerged however (Bu-
covetsky 1991, Arnold 2001, Eggert and Kolmar 2001, Stöwhase 2004, Marceau 
and Mongrain 2004).
An ineffi cient provision of public services might only result if economies 
of scale (non-rivalness) in consumption exist, i.e. when the government provides 
public goods in the Samuelsonian sense (Sinn 2003). Fiscal competition then 
enforces the benefi t principle of taxation such that mobile production factors can 
only be charged the marginal costs of their use of public goods. Mobile taxpayers 
do however not contribute to cover the high inframarginal (fi xed) costs of public 
infrastructure. If this is not to lead to an ineffi ciently low level of public services, 
the fi xed costs must be covered by immobile taxpayers. This can lead to an unde-
sired income distribution.
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2.3. Redistribution Problems
With respect to personal income redistribution, fi scal competition poses more 
important prob lems. Continue the Italy-Croatia example: Italy presumably has a 
higher progressivity of income taxes and pays higher levels of social transfers than 
Croatia. Income redistribution is hence more pronounced in Italy than in Croatia. 
This provides incentives for Croatian social welfare recipients to move to Italy 
because they can expect higher transfer payments. High income earners from Italy 
– ceteris paribus – follow the incentive to emigrate to Croatia. These migration 
incentives impede the decentralized income redistribution at the national levels 
(Stigler 1957, Sinn 2003). 
There do not exist many theoretical arguments against this reasoning. It is 
frequently argued that high income and wealthy people have incentives to voluntar-
ily contribute to the social welfare state in order to obtain social peace (Buchanan 
1975). The voluntary income redistribution is the higher the more decentralized 
the organization of income redistribution is, because recipients are known to or 
can be more easily identifi ed by contributors (Pauly 1973). Many observers ques-
tion however whether the funds obtained from voluntary contributions to income 
redistribution suffi ce to secure a minimum income of the poor. Tax competition 
thus supposedly leads to a more unequal distribution of income.
A variant of such arguments aims at explaining the impact of fi scal compe-
tition on the structure of public spending (Wildasin 2004) or of public revenue 
(Huber and Runkel 2004). If fi scal competition reduces the ability of governments 
to redistribute income in an economy, then the fi scal instruments most prominently 
used for income redistribution should become less important in the government 
budget. With respect to public spending, this means a shift from social transfers to 
infrastructural spending from which fi rms supposedly benefi t more heavily. In the 
case of revenue, it could be expected that the government more strongly relies on 
fees and user charges than on broad-based taxes while the choice of tax structure 
mainly depends on the elasticity of the tax base. Borck (2003) argues however that 
much depends on the location of the median voter in the income distribution such 
that positive capital tax rates can prevail under tax competition.
2.4. Regional Convergence
In the political discussion, a frequently heard argument focuses on regional 
instead of personal income positions. It is contended that fi scal competition results 
in a situation of poor regions becoming poorer and rich regions becoming richer. 
The more ‘good’ taxpayers reside in a region, the lower the tax burden needs to be 
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to fi nance a ‘necessary’ amount of infrastructure. Poor regions however need to 
increase the tax burden to fi nance such a ‘necessary’ amount of infrastructure. Fiscal 
competition then perpetuates income differentials and exacerbates the convergence 
problems of the periphery. Such permanent differences in growth performances 
will however also prevail if agglomeration economies in central regions exist. The 
competition between interregionally active fi rms induces a concentration of indus-
trial activities in economic centers because of an interaction between economies 
of scale in production, agglomeration economies and diseconomies, and transport 
costs. Economic activity is more concentrated in the center while the periphery has 
below average economic activity. 
Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind, Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000), Brak-
man, Garretsen and Van Marrewijk (2002) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004) 
analyze the impact of tax competition on the economic development of central and 
peripheral regions under the conditions normally emphasized by the theory of eco-
nomic geography. Agglomeration economies in the centers allow them to a certain 
extent to levy relatively higher taxes than the periphery without inducing fi rms to 
relocate to the low tax periphery. Agglomeration economies partially compensate 
for the tax advantages in the periphery. The latter therefore has no alternative to a 
tax policy that compensates location disadvantages. Even a strong decrease of tax 
rates is necessary to compensate for agglomeration advantages of the center. For 
example, Ireland has followed this policy in the EU during the last decade and has 
been very successful. Tax harmonization would then be harmful because it would 
exacerbate the resource differences between center and periphery and easily lead 
to demands for higher fi scal equalization.
2.5. Alternatives to Tax Competition
These arguments deliberately accept the premise that tax competition describes 
a clear-cut behavior in the international fi scal competition game. This is however 
only a fi ction. If tax rates are not available as policy instruments to attract mobile 
fi rms, alternative instruments will be used. The state may attempt to attract fi rms 
by offering subsidies or tax holidays. Governments bid for fi rms. Subsidy com-
petition results if tax competition is precluded. Such subsidy competition follows 
however a different rationale. Capital already invested in a certain location can 
be more easily taxed than new investment of multinationals. When considering 
investment in a country, multinational enterprises anticipate that they will face 
problems in repatriating location specifi c investment after it has been undertaken 
such that a ‚hold-up‘ problem results. Firms will also recognize that a danger of 
excessive taxation results from that hold-up and will abstain from investing in a 
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country leading to adverse effects on economic growth. Firms thus aim at obtain-
ing credible commitments from the governments of potential locations that their 
location specifi c rents are not taxed in a confi scatory way. Governments use the 
opportunity to commit themselves in order to induce fi rms to invest in their ju-
risdiction. They hence offer subsidies or tax holidays to compensate fi rms for the 
potential loss from the expected hold-up (Doyle and van Wijnbergen 1994, Bond 
and Samuelson 1986, Black and Hoyt 1989). Haufl er and Wooton (2004) show that 
tax and subsidy coordination is not necessarily leading to welfare improvements 
in such a political environment although it can. In contrast, Janeba (2000, 2002) 
argues that tax competition solves the problem of providing credible commitments 
more effi ciently than tax holidays or subsidies. Governments don’t need to provide 
subsidies as credible commitments because tax competition reduces corporate 
income taxes to a reasonable level. 
Another alternative to tax and to subsidy competition is a competition in tax 
enforcement as the most ineffi cient kind of fi scal competition for fi rms (Stöwhase 
and Traxler 2004). For example, some German states offer a lax tax enforcement 
to fi rms in order to attract them to their jurisdiction because they do not have the 
possibility of changing tax rates in the largely harmonized German tax system and 
are additionally restricted by European law to offer subsidies to fi rms. The lax tax 
enforcement invites tax evasion and tax fraud which is the most detrimental way 
of avoiding taxation because it undermines tax morale.
2.6. Political Economy Issues
These arguments shed some light on the actual behavior of governments. 
The state does not always do what it ought to. Political actors follow their own 
self-interest and seek to get rents from the political process. If a government of a 
member country attempts at securing private rents by increasing taxes, taxpayers 
can avoid excessive taxation by migrating to countries with lower tax burdens. The 
government cannot increase the tax burden of the mobile factor above the level of 
migration costs (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). It therefore has to take the interests 
of the mobile factors into account. Wilson (2005) shows that the competition for 
mobile capital between self-interested governments leads to a strengthening of 
the positive relation between tax revenue and the public input. Tax harmonization 
would be counter-productive because it would facilitate Leviathan governments 
to exploit tax bases. 
In addition, fi scal competition enables citizens to comparatively evaluate the 
performances of representatives and thereby reduce the information asymmetries 
in political markets (‚yardstick competition‘). For example, German voters can 
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compare the performance of the German federal government to that of the French 
government. If France has a relatively high level or quality of public services under 
otherwise same conditions, but offers them at lower tax prices than Germany, Ger-
man voters have incentives to punish the German government at the next election 
day. The German government will anticipate this threat in its decision to increase 
tax rates. Fiscal competition does hence not only work through the migration 
mechanism, but also improves citizens’ ability to exert voice in the political proc-
ess (Besley and Case 1995, Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli 2003, Salmon 2003, 
Reulier 2004). The government is forced to provide public services at relatively 
lower costs and at the level desired by citizens.
2.7. Political Innovation and Economic Growth
Yardstick competition may also be a mechanism to lead to a dispersion of 
knowledge in politics. It is well-known from private markets that competition 
induces product, process and organizational innovation. Competition between gov-
ernments may as well lead to political innovations. Governments can decentrally 
experiment with new solutions for economic problems. Better solutions succeed in 
a process of imitation, copycatting and adaptation by other jurisdictions. Competi-
tion between jurisdictions thus becomes a discovery procedure which contributes to 
the progress in the public sector. In this context Oates (1999) speaks of ‘laboratory 
federalism’ and points out that the reform of welfare in the U.S. in 1996 followed 
these considerations (see Inman and Rubinfeld 1997). 
The higher innovative capacity of fi scal competition as a possible explanation 
for economic growth of countries is however contested. In a competitive system, 
a government is re-elected if it provides services that are at least not worse or not 
more expensive than those in other jurisdictions. Each government has incentives 
to wait initially in order to imitate only those policies of other jurisdictions that 
have turned out to be relatively successful. If the government of a state is uncertain 
about re-election, it has an incentive to act as a free-rider with respect to the policy 
innovations of other jurisdictions fi nally reducing their absolute amount (Rose-Ack-
erman 1980). Schnellenbach (2004) studies the incentives for policy innovations 
in systems competition by particularly focusing on the incentives of voters. As 
voters normally have little incentives to be politically informed before elections, 
policy innovations are mainly possible in times of crises. Citizens’ incentives to 
become informed on policy innovations are however improved by high mobility 
and elements of direct democracy in political decision-making processes. Political 
rents of governments can then be reduced by competition, and politicians can be 
offered incentives to innovate.
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Given these arguments, it could be asked whether fi scal competition or fi scal 
cooperation between jurisdictions has an effect on their economic growth. Still, 
fi scal competition theoretically has ambiguous effects because, on the one hand, 
it might induce higher effi ciency of public goods’ provision and higher political 
innovation and hence a better economic performance of jurisdictions. On the other 
hand, fi scal competition might lead to a migration of mobile production factors to 
centers of economic activity where agglomeration economies can be realized such 
that single poorer regions suffer from that competition.
3. Empirical Evidence on the Existence of Fiscal Competition
All the potential outcomes of fi scal competition discussed in Section 2 need 
not necessarily obtain in the real world. Theoretical arguments do not suffi ce to 
assess fi scal competition normatively. Insights as to the empirical validity of the 
arguments are necessary. In order to observe an impact of fi scal competition on 
effi ciency, redistribution and growth, the existence of fi scal competition should be 
established. Fiscal competition exists if two conditions are met: First, taxes and 
public spending play a signifi cant role in the choice of location of industry and/or 
of residence of individuals (mobility hypothesis). If there is no fi scally induced 
mobility, neither benefi cial nor detrimental effects of fi scal competition can result. 
Second, governments actually use fi scal instruments to attract fi rms or individu-
als. If no strategic tax setting can be observed, a race to the bottom cannot occur 
(strategy hypothesis). 
3.1. Location Choice
The evidence on fi scally induced capital mobility clearly speaks for the exist-
ence of fi scal competition. A large body of evidence that stems from international, 
regional or local data supports the hypothesis that taxes and public spending play a 
role for location decisions of fi rms. The weakest evidence is found with respect to 
foreign direct investments (Feld 2000). While Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines 
and Rice (1994) fi nd that international direct investment of multinational fi rms are 
lower, the higher corporate income taxes, Devereux and Freeman (1995) do not 
fi nd a robust infl uence of taxes on foreign direct investments in Germany, France, 
the U.K., Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the U.S. between 1984 and 1989 if a 
rich set of additional explanatory factors, in particular labor market characteristics 
are additionally considered. Büttner (2002) reports evidence of a joint impact of 
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marginal and statutory taxes on FDI fl ows for 15 OECD countries between 1991 and 
1998, while only weak evidence for countervailing effects of public expenditures 
are found. Stöwhase (2002) obtains tax effects on for FDI of German multinationals 
in eight OECD countries and the same period by identifying an impact effective tax 
rates on real activity and of statutory tax rates on profi t shifting activities. These 
inconclusive results might be grounded in the high aggregation level of foreign 
direct investment fi gures or may be attributed to the fact that statistics on foreign 
direct investment or on portfolio investment are not reliable. 
This has induced an extensive empirical literature on investment behavior of 
multinational fi rms that mainly uses large fi rm level data sets (Hines 1997). Grubert 
and Mutti (2000) focus on new investment of multinationals at particular locations 
in a cross section analysis for 500 fi rms in 60 countries in 1992. They fi nd that 
higher average effective corporate income tax rates on distributed earnings reduce 
the probability that multinationals invest in a location. Mutti and Grubert (2002) 
present evidence for 728 U.S. multinationals in 1996 that a 10 percent increase in 
the cost of capital reduces the probability that a location is chosen by 1.4 percent. 
Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (2001) fi nd a relatively important impact of effective 
tax rates on investment of multinationals in 58 different countries for the years 1984 
and 1992. The relative importance of taxes for international investment has doubled 
during that period. A very convincing study on location choice of multinationals 
has been conducted by Devereux and Griffi th (1998). For more than 1600 fi rms 
between 1980 and 1994, they analyze the impact of taxes on U.S. multinationals‘ 
investment in Germany, France or the U.K. as a two step decision. In the fi rst step, 
multinationals decide whether to invest at all in Europe. The choice to invest at 
home or in Europe is largely independent from taxes and follows along long-term 
sales strategies of fi rms. The second step of the decision consists in the choice of 
the particular country if a fi rm has already decided to invest in Europe. Average 
effective corporate tax rates have an important impact on that second decision. 
Recent meta-analyses on the impact of taxes on location decisions of mul-
tinationals have been provided by Gorter and de Mooij (2002) and de Mooij and 
Ederveen (2003). They review the econometric studies analyzing the impact of 
taxes on the location of fi rms and on FDI and establish the characteristics of the 
study design that affect the size of the estimated tax rate elasticities. According 
to their analyses, the median tax rate elasticity of foreign direct investment is 
3.3 exhibiting an important variation across the studies. Desai, Foley and Hines 
(2003) use the most extensive data set on multinationals’ location decisions with 
20,346 observations. They report a tax rate elasticity of 7.7 for Europe and 2.3 for 
the countries outside of Europe. A 10 percent higher tax rate is associated with a 
7.7 percent reduction in investment. Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) report similar 
elasticities for indirect taxes. 
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Evidence corroborating the importance of taxes for location choice is found 
for federal states (Newman and Sullivan 1988, Bartik 1991, Wasylenko 1991, Feld 
2000). Hines (1996) presents evidence that multinationals locate in U.S. states 
with lower taxes. Feld and Kirchgässner (2003) study the impact of personal and 
corporate income taxes on the distribution of fi rms between the Swiss cantons and 
on cantonal employment. They report signifi cant negative effects of taxes on the 
number of small and medium sized fi rms in different classes of rates of return in 
1981/82 and 1991/92 and on cantonal employment between 1985 and 1997. The 
higher taxes, the lower the number of fi rms and employment. All in all, this is 
strong evidence that international and interregional location decisions are affected 
by taxes.
Tax rate differentials do however not only affect real investment of multina-
tional corporations. They also have an effect on transfer prices that are set between 
parent companies and subsidiaries. If the parent locates in a high tax jurisdiction and 
the subsidiary is located in the low tax jurisdiction, the multinational corporation has 
incentives to set the prices for services provided by the subsidiary at higher levels 
in order to reduce profi ts and thus also taxes paid in the high tax jurisdiction. For 
the period 1981 to 1988, Swenson (2001) presents evidence that multinationals with 
parent companies in the U.S. and subsidiaries in Germany, France, the U.K., Japan 
and Canada increased transfer prices by 8.2 percent on average when foreign tax 
rates decreased by one percentage point. Mintz and Smart (2004) present similar 
evidence for Canada. Declared taxable profi ts of fi rms that have branches in more 
than one Canadian province declines by 4.3 percent in the case of tax hikes while 
otherwise similar fi rms that only have branches in one province declare profi ts that 
are by 1.6 percent lower. Finally, Grubert and Slemrod (1998) argue that transfer 
prices are particularly strongly infl uenced by taxes if a subsidiary’s specialization is 
in research and development. In R&D, the internationally accepted dealing at arm’s 
length principle cannot be used because most of the products of the subsidiary do 
not exist in the market such that market prices cannot serve for comparisons. 
3.2. Residence Choice
Support for the mobility hypothesis is also found with respect to migration and 
residence choice of individuals. Lower taxes and/or higher levels of public services 
attract individuals – ceteris paribus. There is however a fi rst notable difference 
between location choice and residence choice. Because capital is internationally 
more mobile than labor, the international evidence on fi scally induced migration is 
rather non-existent. This also holds for the EU although mobility between member 
states has considerably increased. Labor market conditions and general economic 
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development of a country may serve as the main pull factors in international migra-
tion. Public fi nance still appears to be too unimportant for most researchers to take 
it into account. This holds although there is anecdotal evidence from fi rms which 
have diffi culties to attract highly qualifi ed people to high tax jurisdictions. 
Many empirical studies do however exist for regional or local migration 
and the impact of fi scal policy on residence choice of individuals. These studies 
have been mainly performed by using U.S. and Swiss data because income tax 
differentials and differences in public services are high between the sub-federal 
jurisdictions in both countries. For example, someone living in the canton and the 
city of Zurich who earns a million SFr taxable income per year pays more than 
three times the amount of taxes to the canton and the local jurisdiction of Zurich 
than in the community of Freienbach in the canton of Schwyz which is only half 
an hour away from Zurich. Looking at the evidence from federal states is also 
useful for an assessment of international fi scal competition because mobility costs 
are much lower, the lower the government level such that the potential for fi scal 
competition strongly increases. If fi scal competition turns out to be at least not 
harmful to economic outcomes of jurisdictions at the lower level of governments, 
it is probably having similar effects in international terms. 
The studies for the U.S. broadly support the migration hypothesis (see Feld 
2000 for a survey). They fi nd that tax rate differentials and differences in public 
services across U.S. states and local jurisdictions – ceteris paribus – infl uence in-
dividual residence choices. Welfare payments mainly affect migration of the poor. 
However, many studies also provide evidence that labor market conditions or the 
housing market are quantitatively more important than fi scal policy. In addition, the 
attraction of jurisdictions with favorable public or private infrastructure (in particular 
health and education) as well as a good quality of the natural environment (parks 
and other recreation facilities) should not be underestimated. The differences in tax 
rates and public services at the state or local levels moreover capitalize in housing 
prices (see Feld 2000 for a survey on U.S. studies). Higher taxes induce – ceteris 
paribus – lower housing prices, while a higher level of public services is associated 
with higher housing prices. The tax burden is shifted to the immobile factor land. 
Similar evidence on fi scally induced migration is found for Switzerland. 
Frey (1981) reports only a small or no impact of income tax rate differentials on 
migration between and within Swiss cantons. Feld (2000) fi nds stronger effects for 
cantonal immigration between 1980 and 1990, but the results are not very robust 
to the inclusion of additional infl uences on migration. In an alternative approach, 
the impact of income taxes and public services on the distribution of taxpayers in 
different income classes across the Swiss cantons and local jurisdictions has been 
investigated. Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1996) in a cross section analysis 
for the Swiss cantons in 1987, Pommerehne, Kirchgässner and Feld (1996), Feld 
(1999, 2000, 2000a), Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) in cross section analyses for 
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the Swiss cantons and for 137 Swiss cities and communities for 1990 as well as 
Feld and Frey (2000) in a panel data analysis for the cantons between 1981/82 and 
1993/94 report a strong impact of income taxes on the distribution of taxpayers. 
The impact of income tax rate differentials is quantitatively more important in 
higher than in lower income classes. Tax competition appears to be more intense at 
the local than at the cantonal level and more important for self-employed than for 
dependent workers and for retirees. These results on the impact of public fi nance 
for the regional distribution of taxpayers is corroborated by the Swiss studies on 
capitalization of tax rate differentials in housing prices. Feld and Kirchgässner 
(1997), Hilber (1998) and Feld (2000) report evidence that the higher income taxes, 
the lower are dwelling rents of apartments and houses. The income tax burden of 
high income taxpayers is capitalized more strongly than that of low income people. 
Welfare does not play any role. All in all, there is strong evidence from the regional 
level that fi scally induced migration and residence choice takes place. The migra-
tion hypothesis can thus not be rejected.
3.3. Strategic Fiscal Policy
Fiscally induced migration is a necessary condition for the existence of fi scal 
competition. A suffi cient condition is the strategy hypothesis: Jurisdictions actually 
engage in strategic tax setting. How strategic tax setting emerges can be easily il-
lustrated in the following example: In his tax policy, the Croatian fi nance minister 
has to consider several requirements many of which are derived from Croatian 
legislation and others stem from the infl uence of different interest groups on tax 
policy. In addition, he has to consider the international development in order to make 
Croatia attractive for investments and locations of fi rms. If the Slovak Republic 
decreases its tax rate on individual and personal income to, say, 19 percent, the 
Croatian fi nance minister has to take that into account when announcing the next 
tax reform. Jurisdictions look at what happens in other jurisdictions. They identify 
their competitors and react to their tax rate changes. According to the strategy hy-
pothesis, a correlation between the changes of tax rates in different jurisdictions 
should be observed.
Evidence on such a strategic tax setting exists, like for the location choice of 
fi rms, at all government levels. The fi rst studies have again been conducted for the 
U.S. states and local jurisdictions (Ladd 1992, Case 1993, Brueckner and Saavedra 
2001), but there is meanwhile also evidence on strategic tax setting in Canada (Brett 
and Pinske 2000, Hayashi and Boadway 2000), Belgian communities (Heyndels 
and Vuchelen 1998), German local jurisdictions (Büttner 1999, 2001), French re-
gions and départements (Feld, Josselin and Rocaboy 2003, Leprince, Madiès and 
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Paty 2003, Reulier 2004), Italian cities (Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli 2003), 
Spanish local jurisdictions (Solé-Ollé 2003) and Swiss cantons (Feld and Reulier 
2005). Most of these studies focus on income, business and property taxation. They 
fi nd that a reduction of the average tax rates of competitors induces a reduction of 
tax rates of an observed jurisdiction. Comparable evidence is presented by Figlio, 
Kolpin and Reid (1999) and Saavedra (2000) on welfare payments in the U.S. Again, 
reductions in welfare payments on average in competitor jurisdictions induce a 
reduction of welfare payments in an observed jurisdiction. Moreover, Fredriksson 
and Millimet (2002) provide evidence on strategic interaction in environmental 
policy. Brueckner (2003) provides a survey of these studies.
Most notably, such evidence could also be found at the international level. 
Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2001) analyze strategic tax setting for ten 
OECD countries between 1979 and 1999. They fi nd that there is a positive spatial 
correlation between statutory corporate income taxes of these countries as well as 
between their effective average corporate income tax rates. The lower these tax 
rates in the other nine countries on average is, the lower are the tax rates in the re-
maining ten countries. Besley, Griffi th and Klemm (2001) corroborate these results 
in a study on corporate income tax ratios (tax revenue in percent of GDP) for 29 
OECD countries between 1965 and 1997. Again, a positive spatial correlation of 
taxes exists. Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) provide additional evidence on how 
the U.S. serves as a role model in international tax policy whose tax reforms are 
imitated by European countries. Evers, de Mooij and Vollebergh (2004) fi nd strate-
gic interaction in the case of European diesel excises for 15 EU member countries 
plus Norway and Switzerland between 1978 and 2001. Egger, Pfaffermayr and 
Winner (2004) complete these fi ndings for VAT and excise tax ratios in 22 OECD 
countries between 1965 and 1997.
On the basis of this evidence, the strategy hypothesis cannot be rejected. Fiscal 
competition exists at the local, regional and international level at different intensi-
ties concerning different production factors. It is most intense at the local level in 
countries with local or regional fi scal autonomy. At the regional level, the intensity 
is lower compared with the local level, but higher compared to the international 
level. The evidence provides strong support for the existence of fi scal competition 
for fi rms and individual taxpayers and hence for corporate and individual income 
taxes as well as property taxes (the latter in particular in the U.S.). 
4. Evidence on the Economic Effects of Fiscal Competition
Stating that fi scal competition exists does not tell anything about its impact 
on the supply of public services, the welfare state or economic growth. These three 
classes of economic outcomes must be considered explicitly. However, not much 
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systematic international evidence on the impact of fi scal competition on these eco-
nomic outcomes exists. The empirical studies have mainly been conducted for the 
federal countries Switzerland and the U.S. using regional or local data. What has 
been said in Section 3.2 however also holds with respect to economic outcomes: 
If fi scal competition is more intense at the local or regional level, the hypothesized 
positive or negative effects should be more easily observed in studies on federal 
states. In a ‚Sinatra-analogy‘, we can state: ‚If you can make it there, you can make 
it anywhere.‘
4.1. The Effi ciency of Public Goods’ Provision
To measure economic effi ciency in the provision of public goods is not easy. 
Public services are effi ciently provided if the marginal cost of provision is equal 
to the sum of marginal rates of substitution of users. Though it is not impossible, 
fi nding out the marginal cost of provision is diffi cult, because most statistics on the 
public sector contain information on expenditure and not on cost. The real diffi culty 
emerges however on the demand side. Consumers have incentives to hide their true 
willingness to pay for public services in order to get a free ride when they actually 
expect to pay. Consequently, direct evidence on the impact of fi scal competition 
on the effi ciency of public goods’ provision is scarce.
Bergstrom, Roberts, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1988) conduct the fi rst direct 
test of the effi ciency hypothesis according to which fi scal competition leads to an 
effi cient decentralized provision of public goods. They estimate Samuelson condi-
tion, i.e. the equality of marginal costs of provision of public services and the sum 
of individual marginal willingness to pay for public education directly. The demand 
for public services is estimated on the basis of individual survey data. In addition, 
aggregate data on local jurisdictions is used to assess marginal costs. The authors 
present evidence that the effi ciency hypothesis cannot be rejected. Hoxby (2000) 
develops a less ambitious test by comparing the relative effi ciency of education in 
jurisdictions with a higher and those with a lower intensity of fi scal competition. 
She presents evidence that the performance of students per input unit is increased 
by fi scal competition although it leads to signifi cantly less spending per student. 
In addition, there is a broad discussion in the literature on the impact of fi s-
cal competition on the size of government. According to Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980), fi scal competition restricts Leviathan behavior of governments. Most studies 
attempt at testing this hypothesis by looking at the impact of fi scal decentralization 
on public spending or revenue. There is mixed evidence on this impact of fi scal 
decentralization however. Only the more recent evidence by Shadbegian (1999) 
for the U.S., Schaltegger (2001) and Kirchgässner (2002) for Switzerland and 
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Rodden (2003) in a cross-country study provides unambiguous support for such 
a relationship. Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003) focus more closely on 
the transmission channels by which fi scal decentralization in federal states might 
affect the size of government. They fi nd that a more intense tax competition leads 
to lower public revenue. Moreover, tax competition shifts the revenue structure 
from broad-based taxes to user charges and fees. Tax competition thus leads to a 
stronger enforcement of the benefi t principle of taxation. Kirchgässner and Feld 
(2004) provide evidence using the same data set that again tax competition induces 
lower spending. The estimated reduction of spending for the canton which stands 
most strongly in tax competition compared to that which is the least affected by 
tax competition amounts to SFr 2,114.- per capita and year.
In the theoretical discussion, externalities of fi scal competition are focused. 
Büttner (2003) fi nds evidence for fi scal externalities between small German com-
munities. Murdoch, Sandler and Sargent (1997) estimate signifi cant negative 
benefi t spillovers (sulfur and NOx emissions) for 25 European states. As Sørensen 
(2000, 2004) in his simulation study shows, these fi scal and regional externalities 
can easily compensate for each other. Parry (2003) corroborates this analysis and 
also reports relatively low welfare costs of tax competition even excluding tax 
exporting. Pommerehne, Feld and Hart (1994), with systematic evidence on local 
cross-border pollution, and Pommerehne and Krebs (1991), with econometric evi-
dence on spillovers of public services in the canton of Zurich, show how regional 
externalities are successfully internalized in Coase-like bargaining processes. On 
the basis of empirical evidence for the U.S., Haughwout (2003) argues as well that 
Coasian bargaining is particularly suited to internalize fi scal externalities. Swiss 
federalism is in general characterized by specifi c inter-jurisdictional compensations 
for spillovers. Although this leads to high transaction costs it also induces incentive 
compatibility of public goods’ provision. Indeed, Schaltegger (2003) does not fi nd 
any signifi cant benefi t spillovers between Swiss cantons in a panel study for the 
years 1980 to 1998. All in all, this evidence speaks in favor of fi scal competition. 
The effi ciency hypothesis cannot be rejected on the basis of this evidence. 
4.2. Income Redistribution
Accordin to the redistribution hypothesis in its strong version, fi scal competi-
tion leads to a collapse of the welfare state because of fi scally induced migration of 
the poor to jurisdictions with high transfers and the rich to jurisdictions with low 
income taxes – keeping all other factors constant that might attract migrants. As 
discussed in Section 3.2, this fi scally induced migration takes place in the U.S. and, 
to a lesser extent with respect to welfare payments at least, also in Switzerland. There 
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is additional evidence on strategic tax setting in both countries. There is however 
no evidence that the welfare state in both countries has collapsed – given national 
redistribution preferences. This is particularly interesting for Switzerland because of 
its more pronounced income redistribution. Where does this result come from?
Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003) analyze the impact of tax compe-
tition between Swiss cantons on their revenue structure and report evidence that 
tax competition shifts revenue from broad based taxes to user charges and fees as 
hypothesized by the theoretical literature. These results are in line with more recent 
evidence by Winner (2004) on the impact of tax competition on tax structure. For 
23 OECD countries and the time period 1965 to 2000, he fi nds that capital mobil-
ity shifts the tax burden from capital taxation to labor taxes. The less mobile tax 
base has to be bear a higher tax burden. According to the results of Feld, Fischer 
and Kirchgässner (2003) for the Swiss cantons, welfare spending is however not 
affected by tax competition such that no unambiguous result is found for the spend-
ing structure. In essence, tax competition restricts the use of the main instruments 
of state income redistribution at least at the revenue side. Less funds are available 
for income redistribution if tax competition prevails. They could however be used 
more effectively and in a more targeted way.
On the basis of data from 1977, Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1996) present 
evidence for Switzerland that two thirds of public income redistribution (without 
considering social security in that analysis) were conducted by sub-federal jurisdic-
tions. The income distribution was not signifi cantly more unequal for Switzerland 
in 1977 than in Germany in the beginning of the seventies. Since the seventies, 
the Swiss income distribution has become more unequal than in other European 
countries. This development can be attributed to the fact that the ten percent of the 
population with the highest incomes have more than proportionally gained from 
income growth between 1977 and 1992. Still, excluding social security, the Swiss 
public sector redistributes as much income in 1992 as in the end of the seventies. 
The share of sub-federal jurisdictions from this amount of income redistribution 
has even increased during the same period (Feld 2000, 2000a). In addition, cantons 
and local jurisdictions have relied more heavily on taxes than on spending to ac-
complish income redistribution. Although Feld, Fischer and Kirchgässner (2003) 
fi nd some evidence that tax competition between cantons is leading to less income 
redistribution, this effect is not robust to the primary distribution of income. There 
is thus some indication that tax competition forces cantonal governments to redis-
tribute income more effectively. 
It should moreover be noted that the most important differences between fi scal 
competition in federal states on the one hand and international fi scal competition 
on the other hand must be attributed to the distribution branch. The Swiss cantons 
and local jurisdictions as well as the U.S. states and local jurisdictions are indeed 
embedded in a system with much income redistribution undertaken by the federal 
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level. The public acceptance of the effects of fi scal competition on the income dis-
tribution thus hinges on the fact that there is some redistribution of income at the 
federal level. In Switzerland, the progressive federal income tax, the source tax on 
interest income and the pay-as-you-go part of the Swiss pension system are central-
ized and have a strong redistributive impact. Similarly, the U.S. federal income tax 
is most important for income redistribution. In addition, both countries had strong 
residence requirements for longer time periods. As it is well documented by the U.S. 
studies on migration and welfare (Moffi tt, 1992), residential requirements could be 
crucial for decentralized redistribution to work. Until 1969, the U.S. states imposed 
residence requirements on potential welfare recipients according to which they could 
only obtain welfare payments in a state if they had worked at least two years in the 
same state in which they applied for social welfare. The residence requirement was 
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in that year. Evidence for a harmful 
welfare migration has been provided only for the period after that Supreme Court 
decision. In Switzerland, a citizenship principle existed until 1979 according to 
which the places of citizenship were responsible for social welfare of their citizens. 
Citizenship has been inherited. If the place of residence of a welfare recipient was 
different from the place of citizenship, he could be forced to move back in the place 
of citizenship or obtained lower transfer payments than he would have received at 
the place of residence. Finally the Swiss political decision-making process plays 
a role for income redistribution. Since Swiss cantons to differing degrees enable 
voters to participate directly in fi scal decision-making by referenda on tax rates, 
spending or budget defi cits, and because institutional competition of direct with 
representative democratic cantons induces the latter to deviate not too much from 
basic redistributive concerns, fi scal competition in Switzerland may not lead to a 
collapse of the welfare state as well. Actually, tax competition is less pronounced 
in cantons with a tax referendum than in those without one (Feld 1997). The strong 
redistribution hypothesis must therefore be rejected for Switzerland. The existing 
extent of decentralized income redistribution depends however on particular rules 
at the federal level.
4.3. Economic Growth, Regional Convergence and Political Innovation
If there is the famous trade-off between effi ciency and equity in the assessment 
of fi scal competition, is there any indication on the dynamic effi ciency of competi-
tive fi scal systems? A widely used proxy for dynamic effi ciency is the growth of 
GDP per emplyoee. The impact of fi scal competition on economic growth is even 
less intensively studied than that on effi ciency or income redistribution. There is a 
more recent literature mainly with cross-country evidence, but also with evidence on 
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Chinese provinces, German or U.S. states that attempts at analyzing whether fi scal 
decentralization has a positive or negative impact on economic growth. The main 
disadvantage of the empirical approach in those studies is that fi scal decentraliza-
tion is almost exclusively measured by the share of spending (or revenue) of lower 
level jurisdictions from total spending (or revenue). This share is not measuring 
fi scal autonomy. It could easily be the case that sub-federal jurisdictions spend a 
relatively large share, but are forced to do so by federal mandates or do not raise 
funds autonomously to fi nance that spending such that they depend on the federal 
government. This holds for example for Mexico (Feld 2003). It is thus not surpris-
ing that the existing studies do not fi nd any clear-cut evidence on this relationship 
(Feld, Zimmermann and Döring 2003). 
There is one paper in which the impact of tax competition on economic per-
formance is analyzed. Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2004) present evidence 
for the Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 that tax competition has not been harmful 
to economic performance of the cantons. In addition, no evidence on the impor-
tance of economies of scale for economic performance is found in that study. The 
arguments for a merger of cantons are thus not supported by the evidence from this 
paper. Still no evidence on the impact of fi scal competition on regional convergence 
exists. However, Desai, Foley and Hines (2004a) analyze the economic effects of 
regional tax havens and fi nds that the use of tax havens indirectly stimulates growth 
of operations in non-haven countries in the same region while Hines (2004) points 
to the fact that tax havens particularly gain from tax competition. This evidence 
shows that regional tax havens have effects on economic performance although they 
do not tell anything about agglomeration effects in central regions and locational 
disadvantages of the periphery.
With respect to the impact of fi scal competition on political innovation only 
evidence from case studies can be found. Feld and Schnellenbach (2004) discuss 
the diffusion of administration reforms (new public management) at the Swiss local 
level during the nineties and the welfare reform of the U.S. in 1996. In particular, 
the latter example has been explicitly conducted with the expectation of the federal 
government that the states as a laboratory for welfare policies are better suited to 
fi nd the most reasonable solutions for welfare policy. Although the welfare reform 
is a success story and the expectations are thus not disappointed, it must be noted 
that there are still federal mandates aiming at a quality control of these reforms. 
The U.S. welfare reform is hence not exclusively providing evidence for the suc-
cess of fi scal competition in inducing political innovation. Much needs to be done 
to get a more conclusive picture in this area. 
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5. Policy Conclusions
In policy debates across Europe, tax competition is very critically perceived. 
Most fi nance ministers would rather harmonize taxes than allow for tax competition. 
They fear that mobile tax bases will not contribute to the fi nancing of European wel-
fare states anymore. In this paper, the main theoretical arguments are discussed and 
evaluated as to what impact tax competition has on the provision of public services, 
on income redistribution by the state and on economic development. Moreover, the 
arguments from the theoretical analysis are confronted with the existing empirical 
evidence. Several conclusions can be drawn from that analysis:
1. It is misleading to talk about tax competition. Taxes are prices for public 
services and the public insurance provided by welfare states. Governments 
fi nd themselves in a locational competition of which fi scal competition is an 
important part. It is also misleading to trace the development of statutory or 
average effective tax rates over time without controlling other factors that 
affect location or residence choices. 
2. The international and regional evidence provide overwhelming support for 
the existence of fi scal competition. Firms’ international or regional location 
choices – ceteris paribus – depend on corporate and personal income tax rate 
differentials and on differences in public services. Taxes also play a signifi -
cant role for the choice of transfer prices of multinational fi rms. The higher 
taxes, the less attractive a jurisdiction. Residence choices depend on personal 
income taxes, public infrastructure and welfare payments. The evidence for 
the latter mainly stems from interregional fi scal competition in federal states. 
International evidence does not exist. Being aware of fi scally induced migra-
tion, governments engage in strategic tax setting and enter a process of tax 
and welfare competition.
3. The arguments on the impact of fi scal competition focus on the effi ciency 
of public goods’ provision and the sustainability of decentralized income 
redistribution. While there are contradictory hypotheses on effi ciency, fi scal 
competition is hypothesized to render decentralized income redistribution 
impossible. The empirical evidence speaks in favor of the effi ciency enhancing 
effect of fi scal competition, while the deterioration of income redistribution 
is not necessarily found. It strongly depends on the rules shaping income 
redistribution. In particular residence requirements appear to be useful. 
4. The impact of fi scal competition on economic growth and regional conver-
gence is neither theoretically nor empirically suffi ciently analyzed. Neither 
fi scal harmonization with intergovernmental grants, nor fi scal competition 
can have big impacts on convergence or divergence of regions because it 
more strongly depends on agglomeration economies, economies of scale and 
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transport costs. The few studies undertaken on this relationship indicate that 
fi scal competition is at least not harmful for economic performance. 
5. Perhaps the most important effects of fi scal competition theoretically stem 
from the political innovation it induces. Fiscal competition forces governments 
to fi nd new policy solutions and experiment with them in a decentralized 
fashion. The successful policy innovations succeed in a process of imitation 
and adaptation. Policy innovation means policy reform. Some case studies 
indicate that the innovation enhancing effects of fi scal competition may be 
there. However, much more research needs to be done in this area. 
Is tax competition a challenge? It certainly is, but it is much more diffi cult to 
assess how important the challenge is. Old Europe’s tax systems currently cause a 
tremendous extent of ineffi ciencies and distortions. The violation of intertemporal 
neutrality may be the most notorious distortion imposed by those tax systems today. 
As the recent developments towards fl at taxes or dual income taxes may indicate, 
European governments slowly move towards more neutral tax systems. This re-
cent experience would not have been possible without the pressure to reform tax 
systems that is exerted by tax competition. Tax competition may thus be the most 
important vehicle to arrive at consumption based taxation represented by Manfred 
Rose’s (2003) proposal for the Heidelberg Simple Tax. A consumption based tax 
system does not only provide for intertemporal neutrality, it is also less vulnerable 
to tax competition. 
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POREZNA KONKURENCIJA: KOLIKO JE IZAZOV VELIK?
Sažetak
U «Staroj Europi» gotovo da i ne prođe tjedan dana bez rasprava o poreznim refor-
mama, što je zapravo reakcija na uvođenje jedinstvene porezne stope u novim članicama 
Europske unije (EU). Mnogi promatrači to smatraju izrazom borbe do uništenja za koju se 
smatra da je uzrokuje oštra porezna konkurencija u Europi i cijelom svijetu. Umjesto pro-
matranja brojaka koje opisuju porez na dobit, odgovor na pitanje koliki je zapravo izazov 
porezne konkurencije zahtjeva, prvo, da se iznađe kakav bi utjecaj porezna konkurencija 
mogla imati na alokaciju oskudnih resursa i kako bi se mogla odraziti na redistribuciju 
dohotka od strane države. Drugo, treba doći do empirijskih podataka o postojanju i 
stvarnom ekonomskom učinku porezne konkurencije. Obadvije se ove teme razrađuju u 
ovom članku, te se pokušava dati odgovor na sljedeća pitanja: Kako funkcionira porezna 
konkurencija? Kakav jest učinak porezne konkurencije na  efi kasnost pribavljanja javnih 
dobara i djelotvornost redistribucije dohotka? Djeluje li uopće porezna konkurencija na 
regionalnu konvergenciju i gospodarski rast? I konačno: Da li porezna konkurencija u 
javnom sektoru - analogno s konkurencijom na privatnim tržištima - služi kao “postupak 
brzog pronalaženja” za detektiranje i difuziju bolje politike javnog sektora?
Ključne riječi: Porezna konkurencija, porezna harmonizacija, efi kasnost, redistribucija 
dohotka, konkurencija kao «postupak pronalaženja».
